Inverted Intentionality: On Being Seen and Being Addressed by Westphal, Merold
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 26 Issue 3 Article 1 
7-1-2009 
Inverted Intentionality: On Being Seen and Being Addressed 
Merold Westphal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Westphal, Merold (2009) "Inverted Intentionality: On Being Seen and Being Addressed," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 26 : Iss. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 26 No. 3 July 2009 233
All rights reserved
INVERTED INTENTIONALITY:  
ON BEING SEEN AND BEING ADDRESSED
Merold Westphal
Continental philosophy of religion often takes place within the horizons of 
phenomenology. A central theme of this tradition is the correlation, in one 
form or another, of intentional act (noesis) and intentional object (noema), the 
“object” as given to or taken by the subject. But in dialectical tension with this 
theme is the notion of inverted intentionality in which the arrows of meaning 
bestowing intentionality come toward the self rather than emanating from 
the self. This theme is developed by Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, among oth-
ers. Since each of these is in some fashion an atheist, it is surprising but im-
portant that their reflections on what it means to be seen or to be addressed 
keep turning toward the question of God. This suggests that the basic concept 
is important for the philosophy of religion, at least in monotheistic contexts.
Where have you hidden
Beloved, and left me moaning?
You fled like the stag
After wounding me . . .1
How strange! Are not the hunter’s arrows supposed to wound the stag? 
But here the arrows fly not from the hunter to the stag but from the stag 
to the hunter. No doubt John has been reading contemporary French phi-
losophy; for Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, are highly interested in such a 
reversal, one in which the arrows of intentionality do not have the subject 
as their source but as their target.
This essay was delivered as the Dotterer Lecture at Penn State University in March, 
2008.
1These are the opening lines of The Spiritual Canticle by St. John of the Cross, 
his poetic version, along with commentary, of the Song of Songs, a.k.a. the Song 
of Solomon, a.k.a. the Canticle. See The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, trans. 
Kieran Kavanaugh, O.C.D. and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D. (Washington, D.C.: ICS 
Publications, 1991), p. 471. In the commentary, it is made clear that it is the love 
of the Beloved (Bridegroom, Son of God) that has wounded the lover (Bride, hu-
man soul). These wounds are the product of “fiery arrows,” but since they are 
the wounds of love, they are “very delightful and desirable” (pp. 478, 484–485). I 
have used these lines in a different, but related context. See “The Welcome Wound: 
Emerging from the il y a Otherwise,” Continental Philosophy Review 40 (2007), pp. 
211–230.
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Levinas, for example, in spite of his sustained critique of Husserl2 and of 
Heidegger (for making an important but incomplete break with Husserl),3 
insists that his work is still phenomenology, even if not a phenomenology 
of “thematizing intentionality” and “the impatience of a grasping.”4 He is 
interested in “an intentionality of a wholly different type,” one which is 
oriented to non-adequation rather than adequation and which does not have 
“the noesis-noema structure.”5
We should remind ourselves of a few basic aspects of the “thematizing 
intentionality” in which a subject (re)presents an object (theme) to itself. 
Its noesis-noema structure refers to this subject-object relation, signifying 
both the distinction and the correlation between the intentional act and 
the intentional object. Intentional acts (noeses) are “certain mental pro-
cesses of specific and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, 
memory, predication, etc.”6 Descartes can be read as offering a classifica-
tion of intentional acts in a crucial question and answer. “But what then 
am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory 
perceptions.”7 The same object can be (differently) given in different kinds 
of intentional acts. Thus I can perceive the birds at one of our bird feeders; 
or I can imagine them as, say, having better manners; or I can remember 
what greedy little buzzards they have always been. These are three dis-
tinctively different modes of (re)presentation.
There are two mistakes one might make regarding the “objects” (noe-
mata) of such intentional acts. The first would be to assume that they must 
be physical objects. They can be, of course, but they can also be facts, actual 
or possible. I can believe, doubt, or hope that the cat is on the mat. They 
can be events, actual or possible. I can remember or wish for my wedding. 
But they need not have the tie to the empirical world that physical objects, 
such facts, and such events have. They can be fictions, such as the Easter 
Bunny or Sidney Carton. Then there are “objects” whose ontological sta-
tus is even more puzzling: the number three and the square circle. Each of 
these can be the “object” (theme, sense, content) of some particular type of 
2See especially “The Work of Edmund Husserl,” in Discovering Existence with 
Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), pp. 47–87. This text is shorter, and perhaps more to the 
point than The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology.
3See especially “Is Ontology Fundamental?” in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. 
Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1996), pp. 1–10.
4Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), pp. xiii–xv. Henceforth GCM.
5Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), pp. 23, 27, 29. Cf. pp. 294–295. Henceforth TI. In Husserlian phenom-
enology adequation involves the correspondence between meaning-intention and 
meaning-fulfillment, the intuitive confirmation of what an intentional act antici-
pates. See Investigation VI of Logical Investigations.
6The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 9. Henceforth IP.
7Second Meditation. 
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awareness, what I am thinking “about.” In each case they are the noematic 
correlate of a noetic act.
The second mistake to avoid is to think of the intentional “object” of 
an intentional act as transcendent, as “out there” somewhere apart from 
the act by which it is thematized or (re)presented to consciousness, as 
having some sort of positive ontological status on its own, as fictional 
characters, numbers, and even the square circle are sometime said to 
have. Thus the noema or sense (Sinn) is “the perceived as perceived,” “the 
remembered as remembered,” or “the judged as judged,” and thus is im-
manent to the act whose object it is.8 This sense (Sinn) may have some 
transcendent “object” as its reference (Bedeutung), but the two are phe-
nomenologically distinct.9
This immanence has nothing to do with the distinction between the 
real and the imaginary. Thus, for example, objects of hallucinations and 
misperceptions are, as noemata, no more immanent to the intentional acts 
in which they are given than actual objects accurately perceived. The real 
snake I perceive correctly, the unreal snake I perceive during delirium 
tremens, and the coiled rope that I misperceive as a snake in the dark all 
have the same status phenomenologically. In each case the “object” (sense, 
theme) of an act of perception is a snake. The fact that in two of the three 
cases there is actually no snake there should not obscure this point. Nei-
ther hallucination nor misperception keeps the experience from being in 
the mode of perception. It is surely not an act of memory or imagination. 
In each case, phenomenologically speaking, I see a snake.10
What is of special import for present purposes is the notion of the 
intentional object as constituted by the intentional act and the function-
ally synonymous idea of intentionality as the act of Sinngebung (meaning 
bestowal). Husserl’s “principle of all principles” states “that every originary 
presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything origi-
narily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is 
to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the 
limits in which it is presented there” (Ideas, I, p. 44). Given Husserl’s Carte-
sian aspirations, this is surprisingly far from being clear and distinct. But 
the appeal to intuition, combined with reference to what is “offered to” 
or “presented to” us, suggests a view of knowing as a kind of passive 
mirroring; but that is by no means his view. This is why the reference to 
intentional acts is not a solecism and the concept of the given is glossed in 
8Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 214. Hence-
forth Ideas, I.
9See Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Nominatum,” in Readings in Philosophical 
analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1949), pp. 85–102. ‘Reference’ would be a happier translation of Frege’s 
‘Bedeutung’ than ‘Nominatum.’
10It is possible to make this point, as I have just done, without mentioning the 
phenomenological reduction (ejpochv) or buying into Husserl’s neurotic, Cartesian 
fixation on the need for absolute certainty (much less the hope that suspending the 
natural attitude will provide it). But this understanding of immanence is obviously 
related to the reduction as the bracketing of all concern with transcendent reality.
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terms of the active concepts of constitution and Sinngebung, meaning or 
sense bestowal.11
For example, over against the notion that things are “‘simply there’ 
and need just to be ‘seen,’” Husserl argues that “this ‘simply being there’ 
consists of certain mental processes . . . such as perception, imagination, 
memory, predication, etc. . . things come to be constituted in these mental 
processes.” It is as such that things are “given,” that is, “exhibited (rep-
resented) as so and so” (IP pp. 9–10; cf. p. 239). Thus the intentional act 
of constituting or meaning-bestowal (Sinngebung) is that by which some-
thing (in the broadest sense of ‘something’) is “made known” (Ideas, I, pp. 
205–207).
The act of constitution does not bring things into being, transcendently 
speaking, as when God creates the world or Dickens creates Sidney Car-
ton. It is a matter of appearance, presence, and meaning. Something “out 
there” in some mode of actuality or possibility (transcendently speaking) 
is brought to consciousness precisely as it is (re)presented by the constitut-
ing act: thus the actual snake as snake in genuine perception, nothing in 
particular as snakes in delirium tremens, or the rope as snake in mispercep-
tion at night. In other words, the noematic object as presented meaning is 
not merely the mirroring of what is “out there.”
Another way to put this is to say that the “objects” of consciousness can 
be given to consciousness only as and insofar as they are taken by various 
intentional acts. Only as constituted can objects be given. We are concerned 
with “the mode in which something real is intended to and, in particular, 
given in consciousness itself” (Ideas, I, p. 239; emphasis added).
This has a distinctly Kantian flavor about it, especially when noetic acts 
are described as “animating stuff and combining it into manifold-unitary 
continua and syntheses” and in this way allowing it to be “made known” 
(Ideas, I, p. 207). Husserl does not wish to deny the passivity of sensa-
tion, but only its identification with consciousness. There is matter (hyle 
or hyletic data), to be sure, but there is always more. “But the stuffs, we 
said earlier, are ‘animated’ by noetic moments; they undergo (while the 
Ego is turned, not to them, but to the object)12 ‘construings,’ ‘sense-be-
stowals,’ which, in reflections, we seize upon precisely in and along with 
the stuffs.” The noemata, objects of intentional acts, are the products of 
the “hyletic moments” along with the “animating construals” (beseelenden 
Auffasungen) by which they are “transcendentally constituted” (Ideas, I, pp. 
238–239). This is the intentionality that will be inverted so that meaning 
bearing arrows come toward the subject rather than emanating from it.13
11It is especially important to remember this in relation to Husserl’s neurotic, 
Cartesian fantasy of “absolute self-givenness” and “absolute givenness.” IP, pp. 7, 
24, 35.
12Cf. Kant’s “refutation of idealism” in the First Critique.
13The relation between the phenomenological theory of consciousness as inten-
tional, as consciousness of . . . , and various “analytic” philosophies of mind is 
complex, especially when it comes to self-consciousness. See, for example, Dan Za-
havi, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2005). But the fundamental claim that consciousness is unique is a re-
sistance to reductionist theories and to any attempt to naturalize consciousness 
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Sartre’s contribution to the theory of inverted intentionality comes in his 
important analysis of “The Existence of Others,” culminating in his de-
scription of “The Look.”14 He asks the genuinely phenomenological ques-
tion: How is the Other given in my experience as another person, self, or 
subject (knower or agent) like me? His answer begins with an emphatic 
negation: not as an object of knowledge. In other words, the entire pre-
ceding analysis of intentionality in its subject-object mode (transcendently 
speaking) or in its noesis-noema correlation (phenomenologically speak-
ing) is irrelevant on this matter. It sheds no light on how the Other is given 
to me as a subject, and it is precisely as such that I experience the Other. 
But I have no intuition or perception of that inwardness, that first person 
consciousness (not my own) by virtue of which I experience the Other 
as another person or self. Nor is the “soul” of the Other a hypothesis or 
conjecture, produced perhaps with the help of analogy, for which I could 
seek to provide evidence or proof. Attempts to prove the reality of the 
Other as subject are as silly, for Sartre, as attempts to prove the existence 
of the external world. The philosophical task is not to overcome doubt but 
to clarify a distinctive mode of givenness.
If the Cartesian cogito, along with the noesis-noema intentionality 
which is best read as its explication, is not the scene in which the Other 
shows up, neither is that scene a derivation from the cogito, a supplement 
that is the necessary condition for the objectivity of my experience. If my 
act of constituting an object is unique and idiomatic, unsupported by acts 
of other subjects that agree with mine, then the result is merely subjec-
tive, not essentially different from the insane belief that I am Napoleon. 
Thus we try to discredit claims of fact or value we do not share by saying, 
“That’s just your opinion.” It belongs to the very idea of an object that oth-
ers will see, feel, hear, judge, etc in agreement with our seeings, feelings, 
hearings, and judgings. Thus the Other as another origin of intentional 
acts is, if not presented to us in intuition or perception, appresented (Kant 
might say postulated) along with the objects of our own intentional acts. 
So we have it in Husserl’s Fifth Meditation.
But Husserl gives away how minimal a break, if any, this represents 
from the Cartesian supremacy of the cogito. For this alter ego is “consti-
tuted in me” so that “the proposition that everything existing for me must 
derive its existential sense [Seinsinn] exclusively from me myself, retains 
its validity and fundamental importance.”15 Sartre takes Heidegger’s ac-
count of Mit-Sein in Being and Time as a variation on the Husserlian theme 
in which both self and Other are understood as (practical) Being-in-the-
World rather than (theoretical) consciousness. Thus, in agreement with 
Sartre, Levinas’s critique of Heidegger is at the same time a critique of 
and thereby knowledge by making them primarily or even exhaustively into ob-
jects of some empirical science, be it psychology, neuro-physiology, cognitive sci-
ence, or whatever.
14Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), Part Three, Chapter One. “The 
Look” is Section IV of this chapter.
15Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 128, 130, 149–150.
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Husserl. He sets his own viewpoint over against “the collectivity that says 
‘we’, that, turned toward the intelligible sun, toward the truth, feels the 
other at its side and not in front of itself.”16
We free ourselves fully from the hegemony of the cogito, both as a theory 
of the self and as the self therein theorized, only when we move, individu-
ally and together, to a fully inverted intentionality in which the arrows of 
intentionality (constitution and Sinngebung) are aimed at me rather than 
emanating from me. Sartre does precisely this in his answer to the ques-
tion: how is the Other given in my experience as another person, self, or 
subject (knower or agent) like me? Not as an object of knowledge, intuited, 
perceived, hypothesized, conjectured, appresented, or postulated, but in 
the experience of being seen, looked at.
The appeal here is not to some high powered philosophical analysis 
but to an utterly concrete and everyday experience. Sartre evokes it for us 
with reference to three emotional responses: fear, shame, and pride, the 
second of which receives by far the most attention.
The look of the Other evokes fear because I recognize that as embodied 
I am vulnerable.17 The Other can hurt me in a whole variety of physical 
ways. But the distinctiveness of the Other as another self does not come 
through here; for I can be afraid of an animal or of a storm or of a virus or 
bacterium that brings with it a debilitating or even fatal disease. If existen-
tialism is to be a humanism, as Sartre claims,18 the Look will have to have 
a more distinctively human meaning.
Sartre’s focus on the shame that the Look of the Other evokes provides 
precisely such a meaning. We are not ashamed before animals or inani-
mate nature but only before other humans, whose inward subjectivity is 
the point at issue. Thus the most dramatic moment in his account of “The 
Look.” I am a voyeur, a Peeping Tom (though I do not know myself as 
such). I am looking through a keyhole. Suddenly I hear footsteps behind 
me. I have been seen, and I am ashamed. More precisely, I become pre-
reflectively aware of myself as shameful. J. N. Findlay, who apparently 
hadn’t refreshed his memory of this passage, writes, “Sartre may be able 
to conjure eidetic meaning into two eyes regarding each other through 
the same keyhole, but such confrontations are for the most part best seen 
as embarrassing accidents, over which no great eidetic pother should be 
made.”19 Sartre makes a great deal of eidetic pother over such experiences 
both because they are so utterly quotidian and so deeply revealing of the 
way in which the Other is given to us as such. The Other is the subject 
and we are the “object,” constituted by the Sinngebung of the Other. The 
16Time and the Other, from The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p. 53. Emphasis added. 
17Part Three, Chapter Two of Being and nothingness is devoted to “The Body.”
18See “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, 
ed. Walter Kaufmann, rev. ed. (New York: New American Library, 1975), in a vari-
ety of other anthologies, and as an independent publication, sometimes under the 
simple title, “Existentialism.”
19Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), 
p. 410.
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Look says, “Shame on you!” and in so doing defines me and gives me an 
identity I did not choose and do not welcome.
It may seem that the case is different when the response to the Look is 
pride. When the Look says, “Good job,” or “That was a courageous thing 
to do,” or “I love you,” the result may be that we feel good about ourselves 
and the unrelenting negativism of Sartre’s account has broken down. To 
see why this is not the case, we need to notice two features of the Look.
First, the Look of the Other is necessary for my very being as a self. Let 
us hear how Sartre repeats this point in his own words.
But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me 
. . . I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my 
being. The For-itself refers to the For-others. (p. 222)20
In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, we are told,
has made significant progress over Husserl. Here the appearance of 
the Other is indispensable not to the constitution of the world and of 
my empirical “Ego” but to the very existence of my consciousness as 
self-consciousness. (p. 235)21
Just after telling of how I hear those footsteps in the hall, Sartre writes,
I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the Other. (p. 260)
Thus I can not confer on myself any quality without mediation or an 
objectifying power which is not my own power . . . the Other teaches 
me who I am.” (p. 274)
Second, while the Look of the Other is a necessary condition for my ex-
perience of myself and, derivatively, of the world, this necessity does not 
arise from a formal structure of my own subjectivity, as if it were a Kantian 
a priori. It derives from a fact. We are dealing with the transcendent, not 
the transcendental, with
the fact that being-for-others is not an ontological structure of the 
For-itself. We cannot think of deriving being-for-others from a be-
ing-for-itself . . . . Of course our human reality must of necessity be 
simultaneously for-itself and for-others. . . . What the cogito reveals 
to us here it just factual necessity: it is found. . . . The Cartesian cogito 
only makes an affirmation of the absolute truth of a fact—that of my 
existence. In the same way the cogito a little expanded as we are us-
ing it here, reveals to us as a fact the existence of the Other and my 
existence for the Other. That is all we can say. (p. 282)22
20Page numbers for this and the following quotations are from Being and noth-
ingness as cited in note 14 above.
21For Sartre’s quarrel with Hegel despite this agreement, see pp. 238–244.
22Of course Sartre already has said and will say a great deal more about this fact. 
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Put a little differently
We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him. (p. 250)
Here is a fact that is necessary to my being myself but in which in-
tentionality is inverted and I am constituted by the Other instead of be-
ing able to constitute the other with my own Look. I become dependent, 
alienated, indeed enslaved to a freedom that is no longer my own, that is 
without limits, unpredictable, and often enough unknowable. What is dif-
ferent here from the scene of fear is that the Look makes judgments or ap-
praisals of me, confers a nature on me, and in that sense defines me. This 
is my original fall. The Look defines me not only in the eyes of the Other 
and other Others, but in my own eyes as well. For in the judgments of the 
Other I can all too often and all too easily recognize myself; thus does the 
Other teach me who I am.23
Now it becomes clear why pride does not brighten the Sartrean skies 
over against shame. To be sure, the Look that says “Good job,” or “That 
was a courageous thing to do,” or “I love you,” is welcome in a way in 
which the Look that says “Shame on you!” is not. But I am just as little the 
master of my own identity in the former case as in the latter. My transcen-
dence as the freedom to (re)define myself over against any facticity of past 
deeds or current dispositions has been transcended.24
This fall involves no exile from an original Eden; it is rather original in 
the sense that it signifies the underived and permanent fact of the Hegelian 
master-slave contest between the self and its Others, and at a far deeper 
and more fundamental level than economic institutions. Commenting on 
the verbal Look with which Don Imus defined the black women of the 
Rutgers women’s basketball team in degrading terms, political columnist 
Bob Hebert wrote, in a very Sartrean tone of voice, “People in positions 
of great power are the ones who define those who are relatively lacking 
in power.”25 For Sartre, human existence is a struggle for power. If I can 
define myself and the Other, I am the master. If the Other defines me, I am 
a slave.
The theological overtones of this analysis are heard not primarily in the 
reference to an original fall but in the reference to God. Here we discover 
the heart of Sartre’s atheism. In a trope that goes back at least to Feuerbach 
23I have defined subjective guilt (guilty conscience) as approving the Other’s 
(moral) disapproval of me and, on that basis, argued that there is no significant 
difference between guilt and shame, which can also be so defined. Moreover, the 
Other’s presence need not be actual but only virtual for the essential reference to 
the Other to be operative. “If anyone were to see me do this, I would feel ashamed, 
and so I feel guilty.” See God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Reli-
gion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), chap. 4.
24On the dialectic of facticity and transcendence, see Part One, Chapter Two, 
Section II.
25“Signs of Infection,” an Op-Ed column in the new york Times, April 16, 2007. 
The slave, Sixo, in Toni Morrison’s Beloved (New York: Penguin, 1987), 190, knows 
this all too well. I have discussed this passage in Levinas and Kierkegaard in Dialogue 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 121.
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(and, I would argue, Hegel) ‘God’ turns out to be the name for something 
else. While the God signified by the manifest content of the believer’s us-
age is unreal, according to Sartre, the actual referent (the latent content, in 
Freudian language) is real, all too real, and is deeply problematic.
In a dramatic image, Sartre says I find myself “thrown in the arena 
beneath millions of looks” (p. 281).26 If I treat these looks as an impersonal 
collective, they become, precisely, “the They,” a more ominous They than 
Heidegger’s. But if we treat these looks as a personal individual, their 
name is ‘God,’ a name that signifies the Other pushed to the limit. The is-
sue is power, not causal power, but the power of judgment and appraisal 
and thus of naming, of identifying, of defining.
This is the power that is synonymous with authority. To say, as Sartre 
does, that God is the subject that can never be made into an object is to say 
that there is something irresistible about this authority. But that doesn’t 
mean that we don’t try to resist it. Whether we encounter the other as 
merely human or as divine, our primary strategy of defense is to objectify 
the Other, just because the subjective reality of the Other, so far from being 
in need of proof, is experienced as overwhelmingly and inescapably real. 
Accordingly, “Black masses, desecration of the host, demonic associations, 
etc., are so many attempts to confer the character of object on the absolute 
Subject” (p. 290). Similarly, arrogance, which may look like pride in rela-
tion to the human Other, is something different. In pride, I feel good about 
myself because of the affirming Look of the Other, while resenting my 
dependence on and my vulnerability to that unpredictable and uncontrol-
lable subjectivity. In arrogance I seek to neutralize that subjectivity, either 
by reducing it to a means to my own ends or, more boldly, treating it as if 
it didn’t count at all. Thus, we find that Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man, 
constantly wounded (shamed) by the Look of others, finds it even worse 
to be entirely unnoticed, and is willing deliberately to court both fear and 
shame in order not to be nobody. The look that simply ignores is the most 
violent look of all.
But the fullest account Sartre gives of our defense mechanisms against 
the Look comes in that dreary and pessimistic (and realistic?) chapter, 
“Concrete Relations With Others.”27 We might call him the great secular 
theologian of original sin. For he knows more about the nature of sin, 
though he doesn’t call it by that name, than many if not most theologians.
He takes sadism and masochism to be metaphors for two basic attitudes 
we take toward the Other; the literal senses of these terms signify only 
special instances of a more general structure. Sadism, which includes not 
only hatred but sexual desire and indifference, is the outright attempt to 
reduce the Other to a thing, to reduce the Other’s subjectivity to something 
26If we think of the modern (American) football stadium instead of the ancient 
Roman arena we get the picture. I am defined as hero or goat by the thousands 
of fans in the stadium and the millions watching on TV. They know me as the 
one who made the dramatic catch for the winning touchdown, or the one whose 
fumble cost our team a touchdown, or, since the official identifies me by number, 
as the one whose penalty brought our crucial, last minute, potentially winning 
drive to a screeching halt.
27Part Three, Chapter Three.
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merely objective. Especially to be noted here is the virtual equivalence of 
hatred and indifference.
Masochism appears to be a mode of self-objectification. But on closer 
examination it shows itself to be an assault on the subjectivity of the Other, 
not by denying it but by manipulating it. If I can (apparently) preserve 
your subjectivity but neutralize its authority by possessing it and putting 
it to work for my projects, I have effectively objectified you. When Sartre 
associates love and language with masochism, it is clear that he cynically 
(and perhaps all too realistically) sees them as essentially manipulative. 
Thus, in a famous definition, he writes that “love is [only] the demand to 
be loved” (p. 375).
Here, once again, the theological overtones of Sartre’s analysis come 
to overt expression. Against the perceived threat of the Other as a Look 
that defines and identifies me with infinite and absolute authority, I fight 
back. Against the threat of existential slavery, I adopt the attitudes of 
existential mastery, absolute and unlimited mastery. That is why, in his 
“Existential Psychoanalysis,”28 Sartre will identify our fundamental proj-
ect as the desire to be God. Of course, this is not possible. Not only is it 
impossible for us to be God in the traditional sense; it is also impossible 
in our intrahuman relations to become the Absolute Definer, the Lord of 
Language, the Subject before whom all others are reduced to Objects. Our 
fundamental project is futile. That is why Sartre’s conclusion is “man is a 
useless passion” (p. 615).
We have seen that Levinas wants to develop a phenomenology “of a 
wholly different type.”29 When he says that “in spite of everything, what 
I do is phenomenology,” he explains, “It is not the word ‘transcendental’ 
that I would retain but the notion of intentional analysis” (GCM p. 87). 
What bothers him about the transcendental is that it is just one more in a 
string of epistemic gestures in western philosophy in which the Other is 
reduced to the Same. For Husserl, as Levinas sees him
Light makes possible, then, this enveloping of the exterior [the other] 
by the inward [the same], which is the very structure of the cogito 
and of sense [meaning, not sensation] . . . due to the light an object, 
while coming from without, is already ours in the horizon which 
precedes it; it comes from an exterior already apprehended [cf. Kant 
on the a priori] and comes into being as though it came from us, as 
though commanded by our freedom.30
28Part Four, Chapter Two, Section I.
29See note 5 above.
30Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1978), p. 
48. Cf. pp. 84–85. In Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (henceforth OB) trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991) and the essays clustered around it, this 
“already apprehended” takes on a social linguistic character as the “already said.” 
Edith Wyschogrod writes that within such Husserlian horizons “the object soon 
ceases to disturb us by its alterity as soon as we bestow a meaning upon it. Every 
experience, however passive, becomes a ‘constituting of being’ as if what is given 
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Husserl puts it this way himself:
The world is for me absolutely nothing else but the world existing 
for and accepted by me in such a conscious cogito. It gets its whole 
sense, universal and specific, and its acceptance as existing, exclu-
sively from such cogitationes. . . . By my living, by my experiencing, 
thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the one 
that gets its sense and importance [Sinn und Geltung] in and from me. 
. . . The objective world, the world that exists for me . . . this world, 
with all its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and existential 
importance [Seinsgeltung], which it has for me, from me myself, from 
me as the transcendental Ego.31
Paul Ricoeur finds a “disconcerting glide” in this movement from 
the für mich to the aus mir.32 Levinas immediately agrees. This is why for 
him phenomenology is about intentional analysis but not about the tran-
scendental ego or the transcendental unity of apperception. As he puts 
it, phenomenology will have to concern itself with a “meaning prior to 
my Sinngebung” (TI p. 51; cf. pp. 207–208, 293–295). As with Sartre, the 
movement away from Husserl is toward an inverted intentionality. This 
prior meaning, this prior definition of the world and of myself, comes 
from the Other. As Adrian Peperzak puts it, for Levinas “Light and order 
proceed not from this ‘Being,’ but from something else: from the Other, 
the stranger who comes from afar, from an unreachable unknown, whose 
visage illuminates the world. The human Other’s look is the origin of all 
meaning.”33 The face of the other is no longer an object vulnerable to my 
Sinngebung, but the sign of the fact that I am seen. The ring of Gyges, 
which made it possible for him to see without being seen, to be the subject 
for whom all else is object [noesis-noema], is put, if one may mix metaphors 
here, into reverse gear. It is now the Other who has become invisible (TI 
pp. 33–35).34 As the one who sees me, the Other is no longer an object of 
my perception. Nor am I the sole subject. “I find myself torn up from the 
secrecy of Gyges” (OB p. 149). I exist “through the other and for the other” 
and my very “identity is inverted” (OB pp. 114–115).
As this last phrase suggests, and in harmony with Sartre, there is no 
shortage of trauma in Levinas’s analysis of our being seen by the Other. I 
am put on trial (TI p. 23), I am put into question, commanded, and judged 
(TI p. 51). All this represents “a traumatism of astonishment” (TI p. 73). If any-
thing the theme of trauma is accentuated in the later writings, especially 
originates with the thinker.” Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 98.
31Cartesian Meditations, 21 and 26. Translation slightly altered.
32Husserl: An Analysis, trans. Edward G. Ballad and Lester E. Embree ( Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 89.
33Beyond: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1979), p. 212.
34Levinas frequently refers to the story of Gyges and his magic ring. For an inter-
pretation of Levinas that puts this motif front and center, see Cory Beals, Levinas and 
the Wisdom of Love: The Question of Invisibility (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007).
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but not exclusively in chapter 4, “Substitution,” of Otherwise Than Being. 
The Other “assigns me before I designate him” (OB p. 86). One can almost 
see Sartre shuddering, and applauding.
Yet there are significant differences between Levinas and Sartre; the 
former does not merely restate the latter’s view of inverted intentional-
ity but adds significantly to it. (1) The first important difference is that 
Levinas takes the linguistic turn. The face in and through which I encoun-
ter the other does not just look at me. It expresses itself (TI p. 51). “The 
face speaks” (TI p. 66). We read that “Speech cuts across vision,”35 which 
means that “Better than comprehension, discourse relates with what re-
mains essentially transcendent. . . . For the ethical relationship which 
subtends discourse is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates 
from the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates 
from the other” (TI p. 195) That is inverted intentionality, but now it is not 
so much a matter of being seen as of being addressed. This is why in the later 
writings the distinction between the saying and the said is so important.36 
Regardless of the content of a speech act, and regardless of whether it is in 
a declarative, interrogative, optative, or subjunctive mood, every speech 
act is vocative. In conversation I am always addressed. Here as in the 
Look I am the intentional object of the Other’s intentional act. My tran-
scendence (autonomy, primacy) has been transcended by what “remains 
essentially transcendent.”
(2) A second difference is that for Levinas inverted intentionality takes 
place not primarily within the horizon of power but is most fundamentally 
a matter of ethical import. The face of the Other, the face that speaks (even 
without any speech act in the literal sense of that term) judges to be sure, 
and I can respond in shame or pride. But before it judges, it commands. 
It is the source of the norms by which it judges. As a call to responsibil-
ity, it signifies the teleological suspension, the Aufhebung of freedom in 
responsibility. For Sartre the Look is the origin of the war of all against all; 
for Levinas it signifies the possibility of ethics, of a triumph of an eschatol-
ogy of peace over a politics of war and the reason to which the latter is 
so tightly wed (TI pp. 21–22). Whereas Habermas sees epistemic norms 
inherent in the very act of discourse, Levinas finds ethical norms to be 
integral to speech as such. To be addressed, even in such an unwelcome 
manner as “Your money or your life,” is to be confronted by an uncondi-
tional moral claim.
(3) This is closely related to a third difference. Although the voice of 
the other always commands and judges, putting my very being in ques-
tion, Levinas makes two striking claims about it that would leave Sartre 
35It is clear that Levinas is speaking of vision in Husserl’s sense rather than 
Sartre’s, for he continues, “In knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed de-
termine an act, but it is an act that in some way appropriates the ‘seen’ to itself, in-
tegrates it into a world by endowing it with signification, and, in the last analysis, 
constitutes it. In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other 
as my theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that 
seemed [for] a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my 
interlocutor . . . he remains absolute within the relation” (TI p. 195).
36See, for example, chap. 2 of OB.
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shaking his head. On the one hand, precisely this Other is the object of 
desire (TI pp. 33–35). Of course this desire is not that of my conatus es-
sendi; its origin is deeper than either my empirical or my transcendental 
ego. But, Levinas insists, such a desire is there. On the other hand, for just 
this reason he sees the real possibility of hospitality and of welcoming the 
other, not just to dinner, of course, but into my world as no longer unilat-
erally mine and into my very identity.37 Early on this is limned in terms 
of justice, but eventually this welcoming hospitality is described as love 
(without concupiscence).38
(4) As with Sartre, inverted intentionality has theological overtones for 
Levinas. It is in the experience of being seen and being addressed by the 
Other that God “comes to mind” (GCM). Within the horizons of empirical 
facticity the Other is not God. But as the arrows of intentionality emanate 
from the Other toward me, they are the trace of a divine authority. God 
does not seem to be another Other for Levinas. He speaks of God as “the 
he in the depth of the you . . . He is neither an object nor an interlocutor. . . . 
And this analysis implies that God is not simply the ‘first other,’ the ‘other 
par excellence,’ or the ‘absolutely other,’ but other than the other.”39
Rather than being an agent, a speaker, a lawgiver, a judge, a merciful 
redeemer, and so forth, as in the Jewish and Christian Bibles, Levinas’s 
God seems to be the depth dimension within each human speaker by vir-
tue of which the claim inherent in the speech acts they address to me come 
with a unilateral, absolute authority. It is as if, in response to Nietzsche, 
Levinas is saying, “Yes, God is dead indeed, but the morality of justice and 
altruism is still very much alive. For its ground is the transcendence of the 
human Other, not the transcendence of another Other. ‘God’ is the name 
for this depth dimension of the human person.”40
On one important point, Levinas’s “atheism,” if that is the right name 
for it, agrees with Sartre. In neither case is the God to whom they refer a 
Savior. The trauma of the intrusion of the Other into our lives, the rigor 
of the commands, the sternness of the judgments, the weakness of our 
desire for such an other, and the difficulty of welcoming the Other with 
justice, let alone with love (agape)—all these might lead to that most basic 
of prayers: HELP! But Levinas’s God can neither help us to be good nor 
forgive and renew us when we fail ( cf. Psalm. 51). This God is certainly 
not the God of onto-theology; but it is not the God of the Bible either.
(5) But there remains a marked difference between the “theologies” of 
Sartre and Levinas that we should mark. For Sartre, God is the futile project 
and useless passion that each of us is qua for-itself. For Levinas, God is not 
who I am or am trying to be but the divinity of the Other, the face by whom 
37See the essay, “No Identity,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) and my discussion in chapter 6 of my 
Levinas and Kierkegaard in Dialogue.
38Especially throughout Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. 
Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). We 
might say that eros is aufgehoben in agape.
39“God and Philosophy,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 165.
40For more detailed analysis of Levinas’s “theology,” see chaps. 3 and 4 of Levi-
nas and Kierkegaard in Dialogue.
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I am seen and addressed. That is why such theological terms as revela-
tion, height, transcendence, and glory are used to describe the widow, the 
orphan, and the stranger. Sartre’s world is the Nietzschean world in which 
we strive (in vain) for an innocence beyond good and evil, beyond guilt 
and shame. Levinas’s world is the Kantian world in which we are always 
confronted by an unconditional, that is categorical imperative that intrudes 
upon our inclinations and challenges our conatus essendi. Of course, this 
does not entail a pure, practical reason that produces universal principles. 
One is almost tempted to say that Levinas is a moral nominalist.
John D. Caputo has suggested that the so-called “Levinasian turn” in the 
work of Jacques Derrida is best dated from “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical 
Foundation of Authority’” (1989–1990),41 especially because of the idea 
of something “undeconstructible,” namely justice as distinct from law.42 
This makes a lot of sense, so it is not surprising that a text that comes 
shortly thereafter, The Gift of Death (1992),43 should be, if anything, more 
fully and overtly Levinasian—and precisely on the theme of inverted 
intentionality.
In dialogue with Patočka and Kierkegaard, Derrida poses the ques-
tion of the birth (genealogy, if you like) of the responsible self. Patočka 
presents a two stage account of the emergence of responsibility from 
the orgiastic fusion or demonic rapture within which no self that could 
be responsible has emerged. All is rather submerged in a sacred power 
that is before rather than beyond good and evil. Plato represents a partial 
break in which an individuated soul emerges that is responsible before the 
Good. But it is only a partial break because it is based on knowledge, “an 
eternal gaze toward the Good” (p. 8), an act in which the soul seeks “to 
recall itself to itself” in a “gesture of remembering” (p. 13). The ontological 
fusion of the soul and its object is a significant but incomplete break from 
the orgiastic fusion posited as primal.
Christianity represents a more nearly complete break. Epistemically it 
rests on faith rather than knowledge because it presupposes an inverted 
intentionality that in turn presupposes an ontological otherness not found 
in Plato. It is the ring of Gyges in reverse, and the theme of being seen 
without being able to see the seer is a constantly recurring theme. There 
are several points to notice:
(1) Derrida immediately equates the unseen seer with God.
(2) In doing so he uses Rudolf Otto’s language of the mysterium tremen-
dum as wholly other (GD pp. 2–3, 6, 27, 31, 56) along with the language of 
transcendence (GD pp. 24, 40). Whereas Patočka focuses on Christianity 
and Kierkegaard on a story from the Jewish Bible, Derrida suggests that 
41In acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 230–298. 
The suggestion here is that it is in these writings that the Levinasian influence 
comes clearly into view. Biographically the influence may well be much earlier and 
implicit in earlier writings. 
42In personal correspondence.
43The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). Henceforth GD.
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the structure in question belongs to Islam as well and thus is common to 
the Abrahamic monotheisms.
(3) Although Derrida primarily speaks of the gaze which sees me with-
out my being able to see it, he follows Levinas in making the linguistic 
turn. “God sees me, he looks into me in secret, but I don’t see him, I don’t 
see him looking at me. . . . Since I don’t see him looking at me, I can, and 
must, only hear him” (GD p. 91).
(4) Whether as gaze or as voice, the other of this inverted intentionality 
commands me, and I am no longer the measure of things (GD pp. 27, 41). 
I am identified, individuated, singled out, to be sure,
But not in the sense of a (Kantian) autonomy by means of which I see 
myself acting in total liberty or according to a law that I make for my-
self, rather in the lookout of an ‘it concerns me” [ça me regarde] even 
when I can’t see anything and can take no initiative, there where I 
cannot preempt by my own initiative whatever is commanding me to 
make decisions, decisions that will nevertheless be mine and which I 
alone will have to answer for. (GD p. 91, trans. altered)44
(5) Although he carries on his discussion for the most part in terms of 
the overtly theistic discourses of Patočka and Kierkegaard, Derrida makes 
it clear that this is not his discourse. Hence the famous phrase: “every other 
is wholly other” [tout autre est tout autre] (GD p. 68).45 In other words, ‘God’ 
becomes the name for something else, the absolute authority of the human 
gaze and voice by which I am seen and by which I am addressed. As Levinas 
would put it, God “comes to mind” only in the face of the widow, the or-
phan, and the stranger. There are, to be sure, other faces, but the full trauma 
of alterity is found in those faces I would rather ignore or even deface. A 
kind of Kantian rigorism seems to be at work here. By retaining the theo-
logical language but transferring the predicates to human bearers, though 
not in their empirical particularity, Derrida is able to remain religious. But 
his is a “religion without religion,” without “institutional dogma,” without 
“an article of faith” (GD p. 49). More precisely, perhaps, it is religion with-
out God, and Derrida says that he “rightly passes for an atheist.”46
(6) Finally, Derrida cites a passage in which Levinas says that “inten-
tionality is not the secret of what is human” (GD p. 47). Does this mean that 
44For other places where Derrida breaks with the ideals of autonomy, see “How 
to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward 
and Toby Foshay (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 99 and “Faith and Knowledge: 
The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in acts of Religion, p. 
71. In the former passage, ‘God’ functions as the name for something else, a typical 
gesture. When the question of not speaking arises, “it is always too late. There is 
no longer any question of not speaking. Language has started without us, in us 
and before us. This is what theology calls God.”
45This phrase becomes the title of chapter 4 of GD.
46For Derrida’s commentary on this curious locution, see the interview with Mark 
Dooley in A Passion for the Impossible: John D. Caputo in Focus (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2003), p. 32. The phrase “religion without religion” is the subtitle of Caputo’s The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
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their account of the unseen seer and speaker is “beyond intentionality”?47 
Not exactly. It is more helpful to speak, with Levinas, of “an intentionality 
of a wholly different type” (TI p. 23). For the root idea of intentionality is 
consciousness of. . . . Under the gaze or at the commanding call of the other 
I become conscious of myself and of my situation or world. The only differ-
ence, but of course it is a crucial one, is that it is not from my own standpoint 
but from that of the other that I become conscious of myself and my world.
Derrida recognizes this, for he immediately cites an adjacent passage 
from Levinas: “The human esse is not conatus but disinterestedness and 
adieu” (GD p. 47).48 Left all to myself, my intentionality would be but an 
expression of my conatus essendi, the self-centered self-assertion of my self-
interest. My “rationality” would be calculative and instrumental, the use 
of intelligence for finding the best means to my own ends.49 In the “inten-
tionality of a wholly different type” this rationality and the selfhood it 
expresses are interrupted, challenged, called on the carpet by the gaze and 
the voice of the other.
These accounts of inverse intentionality together pose the question whether 
there is any alternative to the Sartrean arrogant and violent (objectifying) 
response to the vision and voice of the other. Sartre’s ethical Cartesianism 
dismisses this possibility in a footnote. After describing “concrete relations 
with others” in terms of the extended meaning of masochism and sadism, 
he writes, “These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics 
of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical 
conversion which we can not discuss here.”50 Levinas speaks of the possibil-
ity of welcoming the other, in spite of the trauma of being seen and being 
addressed, but he leaves us puzzled as to how this might be possible. Der-
rida pushes the analysis one step farther and speaks of both hospitality and 
forgiveness.51 But like Levinas he is silent about how this might be possible.
47The quoted phrase is the title of an essay by Levinas in Philosophy in France 
Today, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
48Derrida immediately gives his own gloss on Levinas’s ‘adieu.’ See also his 
Adieu: To Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1999). Most of this little volume is devoted to a 
long essay entitled “A Word of Welcome.”
49Nothing is essentially changed if my ends become our ends. Nativism, na-
tionalism, tribalism, racism, chauvinism, etc. can be just as self-centered as any 
personal self-interest and much more violent. It is a moral and political tragedy 
that in so much of contemporary philosophy and social science this definition of 
‘rationality’ is allowed to stand unchallenged.
50Being and nothingness, p. 412, n. 12 (Conclusion of Part Three, Chapter Three, 
Section II). Sartre is a great secular Augustinian. He understands the seriousness 
of sin as pride. So even though he knows nothing of salvation, he understands that 
it would require a “radical conversion.”
51On the former, see Of Hospitality, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000) and “Hostipitality” (sic) in acts of Religion. On the latter, 
see On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes 
(New York: Routledge, 2001). See also Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 163–169, where Derrida 
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If we are hermeneutical phenomenologists we can take what Ricoeur calls 
“the long detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works” 
and of “the detour of understanding the cultural signs in which the self 
documents and forms itself . . . [so that] reflection is nothing without the 
mediation of signs and works.”52 So without appealing to the Bible as 
Scripture, we can look to biblical texts to see what light they may throw on 
the issues before us. It is all the more appropriate since the texts to which I 
turn are from the Hebrew Bible, which doubles, of course, as the Christian 
Old Testament. They provide part of the background against which or out 
of which all three of our thinkers operate.
To begin with there is the beautiful blessing of Numbers 6:24–2653
The Lord bless you and keep you:
the Lord make his face to shine upon you, and be gracious to you;
the Lord lift up his countenance upon you, and give you peace.
In liturgical use “look kindly on you”54 or some similar rendering is sub-
stituted for the less transparent “lift up his countenance upon you.” In 
any case, the meaning is clear. To be blessed is to find oneself under the 
gracious gaze of the invisible God.
Does biblical faith know nothing of the trauma of the look that Sartre 
and Levinas, each in his own way, find to be an undeniable phenomeno-
logical datum? By no means. Adam and Eve hide from the voice of God in 
Eden after eating of the forbidden fruit (Gen. 3:8–13). Like Sartre’s Peep-
ing Tom, the faithful find the divine gaze intolerable when it evokes guilt 
or shame. So in contexts of penitence the psalmist pleads,
Turn your gaze away from me,
  that I may smile again,
 before I depart and am no more. (Ps. 39:13)
Hide your face from my sins,
 and blot out all my iniquities. (Ps. 51:9)
The trauma is felt, but the response is unsartrean. Instead of the attempt 
to neutralize the gaze by one’s own act, the request is for God to act. The 
poses the question “And does one have to deserve forgiveness?” and discusses the 
relation of confession to forgiveness. John D. Caputo has an “Edifying Divertisse-
ment” on forgiveness in a Derridean context in Prayers and Tears, pp. 226–229.
52Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 143, 158–159. Ricoeur also speaks of 
“the detour through the contingency of cultures, though an incurably equivocal 
language, and through the conflict of interpretations.” Freud and Philosophy: An 
Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970), p. 42.
53Unless otherwise noted, biblical citations are from the New Revised Standard 
Version.
54Thus the Revised English Bible.
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request to “hide your face” is a request for forgiveness, “blot out all my 
iniquities,” so that it will be possible to be seen with favor, “Do not cast me 
away from your presence” (v. 11).
The background makes it clear that for the psalmist there is something 
worse than the gaze that renders one guilty, and that is the total absence 
of the gaze, to be completely off God’s radar screen. Our psalmist under-
stands Underground Man’s need to be seen. God has made it clear that 
when the people of God forsake their covenantal responsibilities, “I will 
forsake them and hide my face from them. . . . On that day I will surely 
hide my face on account of all the evil they have done” (Deut. 31:17–18; cf. 
32:20). Accordingly, the psalmist cries out again and again, “Do not hide 
your face from me” (13:1, 27:9, 30:7, 55:1, 69:17, 102:2, 143:7). While God’s 
hiding of God’s face from us can signify withdrawing from our gaze, the 
suggestion here is that in relation to the request, “hide your face,” in other 
words, don’t look at me, we can also read “do not hide your face” as the 
request to be seen.
The paradox of the double request, “Hide your face” and “Hide not 
your face” is only apparent. It is the request for merciful forgiveness so 
that the look may be gracious and welcome. Moreover, in both cases the 
request is associated with the desire to hear the divine voice, to be ad-
dressed as well as to be seen. Thus in Psalm 51 the request, “Hide your 
face from my sins” follows immediately on “Let me hear joy and glad-
ness,” as if the former is recognized as the necessary condition of hearing 
God’s voice as friendly. Then in Psalm 143, “Do no hide your face from 
me” is followed immediately by “Let me hear of your steadfast love .” 
Whether the word of mercy, forgiveness, and reconciliation comes directly 
from God or through a human mediator, the psalmist knows that it is the 
word of the Lord, and it is thus the divine voice that he longs to hear.
As hermeneutical phenomenologists we can turn our attention to a 
rather different text, Puccini’s Tosca. The diva Floria Tosca and the painter, 
Mario Cavaradossi are lovers. Above the altar of the church he is paint-
ing a huge scene featuring Mary Magdalene. He has used as a model for 
the face a woman who has recently been at prayer near the front of the 
church, a woman he has not met and who does not know she is serving a 
his model. When Tosca sees the beautiful face she throws a jealous fit (as 
if to prove that she really is a diva). In his attempt to assuage her anger, 
Cavaradossi sings
I’ve never seen other eyes so lovely as your ardent dark eyes, my 
Tosca.
Eyes that have seared my heart and have engraved there your beau-
ty forever.
At this point it seems as if Tosca’s eyes are merely his intentional object, 
as if loveliness and beauty are the Sinn that has been gegeben by his gaze. 
But he continues
Eyes now aglow with passion, now afire with fury.
No other eyes in this world can rival your beautiful dark eyes.
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The reference to the glow of passion and the (more immediate) fire of fury 
makes it clear that the eyes he sees are the eyes that see him, not objects 
but subjects of an intentionality that emanates from her rather than from 
him. He is blissfully content to be seen by her, whether in passion or in a 
jealous fury before which he knows himself to be innocent.
Unlike the scenes painted by Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, there is a 
reciprocity here. Just as he feels no need to flee from her gaze, she feels no 
need to flee from his voice. She sings
One word from you, my darling, and I can doubt no longer.
Here love is not never having to say, “I’m sorry;” it is rather the blissful joy 
of being seen and addressed by the other.
No doubt, reminded of our own experience by the biblical passages 
we’ve just noted, we may wish to warn the lovers that their reciprocal 
rapture cannot long endure without forgiveness. But they beat us to the 
punch. He sings
You are jealous
and she responds
Yes, I’m guilty. I confess that I am jealous!
Yet I’m certain you’ll forgive me.
I am sure you will forgive me when you know the grief in my heart
to which he responds
My Tosca, whom I worship, who alone makes life worth living,
I’ll forgive you for I know the grief in your heart.55
We are in for plenty of tragedy, but not yet. Here, in the psalms and in 
the opera, we are face to face with the phenomenon of love. Garrison Keil-
lor gives us these lines from the poet Raymond Carver:
And did you get what
you wanted from this life, even so?
I did.
And what did you want?
To call myself beloved, to feel myself
beloved on the earth.56
55From the vocal score with English translation by John Gutman of Tosca: Opera 
in Three acts (New York: G. Shirmer, 1956), pp. 49–54 (Act I).
56From the Introduction to Good Poems (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 
xxvi.
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In the Sartrean world this cannot happen. I insist on calling myself by 
myself without any intrusion of another; so I try to render myself im-
mune to any gaze or any voice with any measure of alterity. Autonomy, 
the glory of modernity, becomes alienation; eros becomes estrangement 
because love is nothing more than “the demand to be loved,” a demand I 
do not allow the other to fulfil. For it is a “contradictory effort . . . without 
solution.”57 I call myself; the other’s voice I silence.
Levinas and Derrida hold out a ray of hope. They do not ignore the 
trauma involved in the gaze and the voice of the other, whom I cannot 
objectify (Sartre’s sadism) or manipulate (Sartre’s masochism). But they 
think there remains a possibility of welcome and hospitality, or, as Mar-
cel puts it, that I will somehow be able to “make room for the other in 
myself.”58 They understand that it will involve the surrender of autonomy 
to a certain heteronomy, but they do not make it clear how this could be 
possible.59
In our psalms and our opera we encounter the hypothesis that the miss-
ing ingredient may be a combination of repentance and forgiveness—not 
the giving of forgiveness, at least not in the first instance, but rather the 
willingness to receive the forgiveness whose need is acknowledged in re-
pentance. What is needed just may be what Tillich has called “the courage 
to accept acceptance.” This courage is not the self-esteem of an “I’m OK, 
You’re OK” pop psychology that knows nothing of the trauma of inverted 
intentionality. It is “the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of be-
ing unacceptable.”60 It is the willingness to be seen and to be addressed by 
someone, human or divine, who sees us just as we are and who accepts us 
anyway. There is, I think, something profoundly symbolic about the fact 
that erotic love takes place, not in nudity but in nakedness.
No doubt we hasten to ask, Is there anyone out there who loves me 
in that way? The question is a real one. But perhaps the prior question 
is whether we have the courage and humility to accept such love should 
there be such a lover.61
Fordham University
57Being and nothingness, pp. 375–376. (Part Three, Chapter Three, Section I.)
58Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2002), p. 88.
59I had originally planned to discuss Jean-Luc Marion along with Sartre, Levi-
nas, and Derrida. But I ran out of space. For some thoughts on his work in connec-
tion with inverted intentionality, see my “Vision and Voice: Phenomenology and 
theology in the work of Jean-Luc Marion,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 60 (2006), pp. 117–137.
60The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 164.
61It is worth noting here that in Kierkegaard’s Johannes de Silentio treats cour-
age and humility as essential ingredients in Abrahamic faith. Fear and Trembling, 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), pp. 33–34, 48–49, 73. Cf. Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 85.
